[wta-politics]NYTBR: 'Who Owns Native Culture?': The Gatekeepers
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'Who Owns Native Culture?': The Gatekeepers
New York Times Book Review, 3.9.14
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/09/14/books/review/14SCHWEDT.html?pagewanted=all
&position=
WHO OWNS NATIVE CULTURE?
By Michael F. Brown.
Illustrated. 315 pp. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. $29.95.
By RICHARD A. SHWEDER
Some years ago an American anthropologist I know, who was trained at
the University of Chicago, sought permission to conduct research among
the Maori people of New Zealand. During one part of an elaborate
bureaucratic process he found himself being interviewed by a
''native,'' a rather well-traveled Maori with an Oxford University
degree in anthropology. This cosmopolitan graduate of aboriginal
descent was a gatekeeper for his ''indigenous people'' and a legally
empowered guardian of their group privacy. He believed that Maori
rituals, art, legends and history belonged to and were, in some sense
or other, owned by the Maori. He believed that the Maori people had a
collective interest in regulating the scholarly interests of outsiders
and in controlling how Maori traditions got talked about in the rest
of the world.
The man took his job seriously. He interrogated the American
petitioner and expressed doubts and reservations about the ''Chicago
School of Anthropology'' as a way of representing the Maori way of
life. And he was in a position to say ''no'' -- to limit research and
restrict the flow of information and to constrain the freedom of
academic outsiders to associate with Maori insiders, including those
insiders who might be willing or even eager to speak to any American
anthropologist who came along. One does not know whether to laugh or
cry.
Every once in a while critical reason triumphs over political
correctness and identity politics, and the result can be exhilarating.
Michael F. Brown, who is the Lambert professor of anthropology and
Latin American studies at Williams College and knows more about
intellectual property law than most legal scholars, has written a
brave, logical and even witty book about some of the hazards and
challenges of cultural heritage protection. His book is titled ''Who
Owns Native Culture?,'' yet his message is one of skepticism and
caution about extending the logic of ownership and group rights to the
music, art, religious rituals, origin stories and botanical knowledge
of any cultural tradition.
Do we want to turn culture into a legally protected resource? Is
cultural heritage something that ought to be owned, patented,
copyrighted, trademarked, licensed, exclusively controlled or treated
as the private property of particular ethnic groups? What are the
risks to a liberal pluralistic democratic society when ethnic groups
are empowered with group rights? Does the assertion of cultural
ownership by indigenous peoples threaten the public domain? Does it
hazardously restrict that region of our open society -- the
intellectual and social commons -- where members of different
traditions can meet, mix, creatively invent hybrid cultural forms and
do so freely and without bureaucratic surveillance?
''Who Owns Native Culture?'' describes a series of fraught and
provocative incidents in contemporary democracies, especially the
United States and Australia, where there is a history of domination
and even genocide of native, aboriginal or indigenous groups. In these
multicultural countries, historically devastated minority groups are
understandably and often legitimately sensitive about the
appropriation, commercial exploitation and disrespectful use of their
culture.
So what happens in a liberal democracy when Australian Aborigines
demand that museum curators forbid all female staff members from
handling the indigenous sacred objects that are on display in Sydney,
out of respect for the sexual division of the world in Aborigine
society? Or when Native American Lakotas object to the desecration of
a sacred site by mountain climbers and by New Age religious
worshipers, and the sacred site just happens to be Devils Tower
National Monument (made famous by the movie ''Close Encounters of the
Third Kind''), which is located in a public park in Wyoming?
What code of cultural privacy makes sense when representatives of the
Pueblo community complain that the sun symbol on the New Mexico state
flag was stolen without permission from a design on a 19th-century
ceramic pot made by an anonymous and unidentifiable American Indian
potter? What about the disempowered forest-dwelling pygmies of Central
Africa? Is there a meaningful modern sense in which they can be said
to own their traditional flute music and distinctive form of yodeling,
traces of which have diffused throughout the globe and can be detected
in Herbie Hancock's album ''Headhunters'' and Madonna's ''Bedtime
Stories''? Should the pygmies be compensated? Why and how? What are
our legal responsibilities under such circumstances? What are our
moral responsibilities?
Brown's writing is gorgeous, often funny, and he has a near perfect
sense of the absurd. Recoiling at the idea that all knowledge is
parochial and owned by those who are insiders (as though only
African-Americans are entitled to rap or sing the blues), he points
out that reggae is currently the music of choice among young American
Indians on the Hopi reservation. In the context of a discussion of
''bioprospecting'' he acquaints us with the famous ethnobotanist
Richard Evans Schultes, who pioneered the study of the roots and
shoots of the forest and the medicinal plants of indigenous people:
''He may have been the only Republican in America who freely admitted
to having sampled just about every mind-altering plant yet discovered
in the New World.'' With regard to the moral majority of rugged
individualists in the state of Wyoming who are indignant about the
rights claims of American Indians, he writes: ''An ethic of
self-reliance contrasts with the reality of ranching and mining
enterprises heavily subsidized by the federal government -- hence the
criticism that Wyoming, like other Western states, practices a form of
socialism for the rich that benefits a few corporations and cattlemen
(welfare cowboys').''
Commenting on the use of the name Redskins (as in Washington Redskins)
he writes: ''Native American cultures have survived five centuries of
pestilence, military conflict and dispossession. Compared to these
catastrophes, in what meaningful sense does the name of a professional
football team put their survival at risk? One could argue just as
convincingly that petty insults actually promote cultural survival by
bringing Indians together in solidarity against the dominant
culture.'' This writer is a sardonic liberal pluralist who is prepared
to defend both liberalism and pluralism without resorting to group
rights and ideas of exclusive possession.
The courage in Brown's book is his insistence that we live in a
morally complex world. Part of the complexity stems from the fact
that, despite some of the illusory claims associated with the Western
Enlightenment, modern, postmodern and premodern values continue to
coexist even in the developed world; and they make powerful and
contradictory claims on our sympathy and judgment. No one really owns
culture is Brown's message: cultural elements are too hard to define,
too easily copied or too long detached from their points of original
creation. Contact between cultures and processes such as borrowing,
appropriation, migration and diffusion have been ubiquitous for so
long that little remains of the authentically indigenous (southern
Italian cuisine got its tomatoes from the New World, the Navaho got
some of their current practices from the Hopi); which is just as well,
and a very good thing for the creative and innovative side of the
human search for meaning.
The bottom line in Brown's book is his challenge to both
multiculturalists and liberal individualists. For he believes we can
develop informal social norms of decency and respect that are
responsive to the concerns of indigenous peoples without turning our
society into a patchwork of legally empowered illiberal cultural
enclaves. He seeks the middle road. Not the postmodern path, at the
end of which there is a free flow of everything, all boundaries are
down, everything is up for sale and nothing is sacred. And not the
premodern path either, at the end of which everything is private,
secreted and shielded from the interest and interests of outsiders,
and the intellectual and social commons have been destroyed. It
remains to be seen whether in a commercial and legalistic society such
as ours there really is a middle road.
Richard A. Shweder, the William Claude Reavis distinguished service
professor at the University of Chicago, is the author of ''Why Do Men
Barbecue?: Recipes for Cultural Psychology.''